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BRIEF OF R.ESPONDEUT
NATURE OF THE CASE
'Ihis is a Declaratory Relief action, filed by Plaintiff-Appellant insurance
compar;y, Government frrployees Insurance Canpany (GEIOO), seeking a determi.nation as
to whether or not William Q-iarles Dennis was a resident of his father's household
at the time of an accident, which occurred on February 25, 1978, and hence, an additional insured under the ten:is of a policy of liability insurance issued to his
father.

Respcndent, Holders, were seriously injured in said accident and hence,

bcervened in this action.
DISPOSITION IN LO\fil\ OOURT

On May 27-28, 1980, a trial was held before the P.onorable Jay E. Banks.
After the parties rested, the Court, in chambers, stated that only one reasonable
inference could be drawn from the evidence and that was that William Charles Dennis
was a resident of his father's household at the time of the accident and pursuant

diereto, t:,.'-\eSponsored
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-2Directed Verdict, but would give Appellant until the follming rmrning
up with some n6'.7 case law.

to

come

However, the next IIDrning, before Appellant's counsel

presented any case law, the O:mrt advised counsel that it had decided to subrrit
the case to the jury.

The C.ourt instructed the jury as follows concerning the

meaning of the term "resident of the same household" and the evidence necessary
for the jury

i::o

detenrj_ne that William iliarles Lerinis was a "resident of the sar:E

house.11olci" as the narred insured at the ti.De of the accident:
"Instruction GO. 14.
In determining whether Defendant, William Charles J:Binis,

was or was not 'a resident of his father's household' as
of the date of the accident, vou should use t.'le ordinarv
mean:L.-ig of the word 'reside.-it'• . In other words' the word
'resident' is to be understood in its plain, ordinary, a.-id
comron sense usage. The test is what a reasonable person
would understand it to rrean.
A 'resident of the same household' within an autorrobile
policy extE:"lding coverage on a non-owned autorrobile to &-iy
relative who is a resident of the same housei1old as the
named irsured, rreans one other than a tanporary or transient
visitor, who lives together with others fa the same house
for a period of sane duration, although he may not intend
to remain t.'lere permanently.
Synonyms of the word 'resident' are 'live, abide, sojourn,
stay and lodge'.
The intended duration must be determined after a thorough
examination of all the relevant facts and cira.mstances surrolll1ding the relationship. A persons intention at the time
in question may be express or iq?lied, or both.
All evidence introduced in this trial, together with the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, should be
considered by you in answering d-1e question submi.tted to
you in the Special Verdict." (Emphasis added).
The above Instruction correctly stated the law with the exception of
the second to last paragraph, which iI1correctly stated the law by rro.Y~ng "intention" an issue for the jury.

Based on the testiIIDny of William Charles Dennis

that his intentions were to eventually IllJVe out of his father's house ar.d return
to Florida, although the subject had never been discussed, the jury found that

William iliarles Dennis was not a resident of his facher 's household at the til'le
of the accident, February 25, 1978, notwithstanding the \.ll1cor.troverted fact that
William
Charles Dennis had lived with his father for three ronths prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to

c.'le

-3accident and haci even got a job during the last rronth prior to the accident and
still continue<l to live with his father.

Pursuant t.1-iereto, the Court entered

Judgrxnt in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellant insurance canpany.
Respondent, Holders, filed a H:ition For Judgm:nt I:otwithstanding ille
Verdict, which correctly stated the law that in a case such as the one at bar,
where a child is living with the nan:ed insured parent at t.1-ie ti...nie of t.1-ie accident
and thus, not livi.1g apart in a separate household at the tillle of the accident,
"intmtion" is not relevant or material to a determination of whether t.1-ie child is
a resident of his parent's household at the t:i.r.'e of the accident.
heard

Oi1

1he Motion was

June 16, 1980, and the Court granted the Respondents' Motion For Judgrrent

,:otwithstanding The Verdict on July 14, 1980, and entered Judgrrent in favor of the
P-espondents to the effect that as a r.atter of law, the only reasonable infereoce
to be dra1<m from t.1-ie uncontroverteci facts is that William Charles Dermis was a
resident of his father's household at the tlire of the accident, February 25, 1978,
and hence, covered as an additional insured under his father's policy of liability
insurance.
RELIEF SJUQIT ON APPEAL

Respondent, Holders , the injured parties in the accident of February 25,
1978, seek to have t.1-ie Utah Suprerre Court affi= t.'-1e decision of the lower Court.

In a very recent case, Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P2d 462 (Utah 11/19/79)
in which Respondent, Holders' present counsel renresented the Defendant-Respondent,

'.iignalls. the Utah Supreme Court reversed a jw:y verdict, finding a fa~ not to
be :iegligent in a fa,._-m accident

which severely injured Plaintiff, and held. as a

matter of law, that only one reasonable inference could be drawn from the uncon~rovert2C! facts and that was that the fanrer was negligent.

by Justice StEWart, stated

The opinion, written

the la1<1 as foll(ftls:

"In detenrrining whether the trial Court properly denied
Plaintiff's M:Jtion For Judgi:IEnt 1btwithstanding The V~r
dict, byOr
For
A c·:ew
irial,
are guided
the offollowing
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-4standards set out in McCloud v. Baum, Utah, 569 P.2d 1125,
ll:D (1977) :
' In reviewing the trial Court 's rulings pertaining to
}btions For A Directed Verdict Or Judgment 1;.o.v., this
Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
to d1e non-ITDving party and to afford him G'-te benefit of
all inferences which the evidence fairly supports. If
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on
the issue in controversy, a jury question exists and die
M::ition should be denied. '
Also see Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431
P.2d 566 (1967)."
After stat:L.1g that "there is no substantial dispute in t..'-te evidence", as in the ccc
at bar, the Utah Supreme Court concluded as follows:
"In Stavart v. Gil.rrore, 323 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1963),

the Court stated:
When the ends of justice require it,
a . . . trial Judge has the prner and the duty to set
aside a jury's verdict, to grant a new trial, or to grant
a Judgment ::otwiths tanding The Verdict. The Appellate
Court has a co=espondir.g responsibility.' See also
Weeks v. LatterSaints Hos ital, 418 F. 2d 1035 (10th
Cir. 1 9 . Accordingly, our duty requires that we set
aside the verdict and the Judgment of no cause of action
and direct that Judgment l-Otwithstanding The Verdict
be entered for Plaintiffs on the issue of liability."
L'1 the case at bar, reviaving all "the evidence in the light rust favorable to the non-!ll)ving party", the Appellant insurance company, and affording it
"the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports", which is rele·
vant and IPaterial to a determination of the issue at ha.rid, Respondent, Holders,
respectfully submit i:hat, as a matter of law, there is only one reasonable ir.ference that can be drawn from the uncontroverted facts and G'-tat is that Williar:
Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's household at the ti.Ire of the accidec:
February 25, 1978.

Based thereon, since "the trial Judge has ti1e pcwer and the

duty to set aside the jury's verdict . . . " and "to grant Judgment Notwithstanding
The Verdict", the trial Judge was correct in so doing in this case and because
"the Appellate Court has a corresponding responsibility", the decision of the rr·_;.
Court should be affinred by the litah Suprerre Court.
U'l:JCO:'l'IBOVER.TED DISPOSI'.::'IVE FACTS
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The following facts are ur.controverted.

GEICO does not dispute these

-5(See Appellant's Brief, p. 19).

facts

1.

William Charles Dennis lived at his father's home from the latter

oart of ~:Overrber, 1977, up to and including the day of the accident, February 25,
1978, a period of about three rronths.

(Tr. 465).

(On Thanksgiving Day, he left

Florida to return home, Tr. 453) .
2.

During the rront.'1 prior to and at the ti.Ire of the accident, he was work-

ing for the Bangerter irucking c.ompany of Centerville, Utah, rn3.king about $600 .00

per oonth as a truck driver, but still living with his father.

(Tr. 461 and

Appellant's Brief, p. 19).
3.

At t.l-ie tirrE he applied for the job with the trucking corrpany, he used

his father's address on t.J.ie application.
'+.

(Tr. 466 and Appellant's Brief, p. 19).

At the t:i.rrE of t.'1e accident, William Qiarles Dennis gave his address

on the police report as that of his father's.

(Tr. 468 and Appellant's Brief,

p. 19).

5.

About one rronth prior to the accident of February 25, 1978, in early

January, 1978, William Charles Dennis was arrested, and he gave to the investigating officer, the address of his father, where he was living at the t:i.rrE, as his
address.

(Tr. 468).
6.

(ADpellant did not cite paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 in its Brief).

.-\bout ~ oonths prior to the accident of February 25, 1978, William

iliarles D=n.'1is IIDVed with his father, l!Dther, and sisters from one reside.'lce address
(3062 South 1475 West in Ogden, Utah), to the reside.rice address he was living at
with his faLl-ier, rrother, and sisters (2518 Pioneer PDad, Slaterville, Utah), on the

ciay of the accident, .February 25, 1978.
7.

(Tr. 4G8 and 503).

During the first three-to-four weeks (Tr. 460 and 508) he was living

'.·.rith his father, he was sick, because of a!!phetamine addiction.

During t.l-ie second

rronth, he was home living wid1 his fad1er, he worked for Parkinson Dairy, as a dairyhand

(Tr . .:+60 and 466).

After t.'1e close of evidence, Appellant's case was reopened

&'ld the parties' stipulated that Pilliam Charles Dennis would testify that he didn't
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-6recall working for Parkinson Dairy duri;:ig this particular three rronth period of
tirre before the accident.
8.

(Tr. 522).

William Qiarles Denni.s brought with him from Florida, some

persona~

items, a suitcase, an army foot locker, his car, his dog, and some gifts, induct·
some vases, rnacranes, and a hand-made stool (Tr. 454, 459, and 503); he ate rmsc
of his rreals at his father's residence, and he slept there.
(Tr. 467 and Appellant's Brief, p. 19).

at the house.
9.

He had his own room

His parents provided him with TIOnetary assistance, including m::me;i

for toilet articles and other needs and helped tune-up his car, while he was res;.
ding with them.
parents.

In addition, he did not pay any rent while he lived with his

(Tr. 467, 502, and Appellant's Brief, p. 19).

10.

During the three l!Dnths that he was living with his father, the

question of Mr. Dennis' intentions as to how long he was going to be there and
when, i f ever, he was goL-ig back to Florida, never came up and the subject was
(Tr. 501 and AP1Jellant's Brief, p. 19).

never discussed.
ll.

During the b.l.ree rronth period of tirre prior to the accident, when

William Charles Dennis was living with his father, he was not looking for another
place to live, and he was not living at or maintaining or paying for ar,other or
separate residence.

12.

(Tr. 468).

William Charles Dennis' prior residence before coming to Utah in

lbvenber, 1977, to live with his father, was an apartment in Florida where he had
lived with a fenale roorrmate for one l!Dnth, but he could not even recall the
address of the apartment or the roorrrmte' s DaCTe.
Brief, p. 19).

(Tr. 450-451 and Appellant's

He paid one-half the rent for that rmnth, October, 1977, but he

didn't pay any rent in Florida for tJoverrber or Decerrber of 1979, or January or
February of 1978.

(Tr. 452 and 477).

During the three rnnths he resided wich hi 5

father in Utah, prior to the accident on February 25, 1978, William Chdrles DeM"-i
made no attempt to locate the address of his prior residen::e, the aparnnent i.Jhere
Sponsored
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-7-

STA1EMEi.u OF THE APPLICABLE I.AW ID 'Il!E Ui'TCONl.1\0VER.i.lill
DISPOSITIVE FACTS
In a recent 1979 Annotation at 93 ALR 3d 420-465, entitled ''\-ho Is 'Resident Or Hauber' Of Sam2 'Household' Or 'Family' As Named Insured, Within Liability
Insurance Provision Definir1g Adcli.tional Insureds", the author, after reviewing all
of the decided cases on this swject, concludes that v.ihere a child is living with
his narred insured parent at the tirre in question, as in the case at bar, all of the
ciecided cases have fou:-id that the child was a resident of his parents' household
at the tirre in question.

There is not one case to the contrary.

Thus, in the case

at bar, as a matter of law, \Jilliam Oiarles Dermis, "who had lived with his father
for three m:mths prior to and including the day of the accident", was a resident
of his father's household at the t:irr.e of the accident.
In addition, the author concludes that the 'intentions" of the alleged insured
"~an

inportant consideration" only where the child, at the time in question,

"is living apart from the named insured" in a separate household.

If the child

is not living apart in a separate household at the ti.me in question, the parties'
"intentions" are not material or relevant.

1hus, in the case at bar, as a matter

of law, since William Oiarles Dennis was not living apart in a separate household
at the tirre of the accident, his "intentions" as to ooving from his father's
residence and returning to Florida are not material or relevant and it was error
for the trial Court to have made his "intentions" an issue for t.'ie jury to resolve.
FL'l.3.lly, the author recognizes that the Courts have determined that the
tenn "resident" is anbiv.ious and as a result, in cases where an alleged insured
is att~ting to be included as a..-i insured tmder the policy, the term "resident"
should be interpreted liberally in favor of coverage, and furu.'1er, that in exclusion cases where the insurance canpany seeks to exclude an alleged insured from
coverage

if he is found to be a resident of the naIIEd irsured' s household, the

tenn "resident" should be strictly or narrowly interpreted.

Although the case

by the S.J.case,
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Library. Funding
for digitization
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-8the term "resident", the Appella.'1t, GEICO, cites and relies on four living auart
inclusion cases and three exclusion cases in an atte:npt to create a jury issue
the alleged insured's intentions and to have the Court apply a strict or
terpretation to tJ1e tem "resident".

a;

ciarm.1.

Because the case at bar is a living with.Jr:·

clusion case, where the alleged relative insured was living with the narr.ed insur0:
at the ti.Ire of the accident, the living aDart inclusion cases and the exclusion co,
where the alleged insured' s "intentions" l!'ay be relevant and P.'aterial and create
a jury issue, are not releva.-it or applicable to the case at bar.

OTHER FACTS WHICH ARE

~m

RELEVANT OR MATERIAL

The other facts which are cited by Appellapt insurance co~any in its

Ed

on pages lG-18, relate to the "intentions" of \villiam Charles Dennis and his fath:
concerning how long William iliarles Dennis intended to stay with his father (Appe'.·
lant's Brief, p. 17(2) and (3)) and the "intentions" of William iliarles Dennis
respect to returning to Florida.

(Appellant's Brief, page 18(11) and (12)).

1·~-c

::ot-

withstanding 1..hat the "intentions" of Willia.'ll Qiarles I:ennis and his father irav

:~c

been as to how long he planned to live with his father or as to his desire to retc:
to Florida, subjects -wnich the Appellant admits never came up and were never discussed (Tr. 501 and Appellant's Brief, p. 19), in a case such as the one at bar,
where a child is living 'ilith the named insured parent at the tire in question and
thus, not living apart in a separate household at the time in question, the "intio·tions" of the child, William lliarles Lennis, and the named insured, his father, an
not material or relevant and do not create an issue for the jury to resolve as to'
determination of whether the child is a resident of his father's household
Appellant insurance rornpany cites other i.mdisputed facts, which do not
ronflict with the undisputed dispositive facts set forth abeve.

HCMever, the

facts cited by Appellant are too rermte or are not rmterial or relevant to a detennii.-iation of whether William Qiarles Demiis was a resident of his father's houseSponsored
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-9William 01arles Dennis was doing during the six years preceding his ret= to Utah
to live with his father (Appellant's Brief, p. 16(1) and 17(4), (5), (6), (7), and
(8)) a.'1d what possessions he left in Florida and what possessions he brought with

him

to

Utah (Appellant's Brief, p. 17(9) and 18(10) and (12)), together with certain

other facts involving his driver's license, his prior residence in Florida, his
prior non-use of his father' S aUtOITDbile, and his father' S apPliCation to renew his
insura.-ice policy.

(Defendant's Brief, p. 18(14), (15), (16), and (17)).
APill1EtIT

TIIE LOWLR COURT CORRECTLY DETERMWED TIIAT, AS A MATTER OF IAW,
111E ONLY RfASONABIE INFERENCE 'ID BE DRAllN FROM TilE UNCONIROVERTED
FACIS WAS TilAT WII.LIAM CHARLES DEtWIS WAS A RESIDBIT OF HIS
FA.Lr!ER'S HOUSIBOlD AT TilE TIME OF 'IHE ACCIDmr AND HENCE, All
ADDITIONAL II-OIBED ULIDER HIS FA.Lr!ER' S POLICY OF LIABILI'IY mSURANCE
On February 25, 197 8, William Cliarles Dennis was driving an autOimbile

belongi...'1g to Sandra Freestone, who was a passenger in the front seat, when said
autombile, which, at the time, was on the wrong side of the road, collided witi:t
a IJDtor vehicle driven by Jarres Holder, in which his pregnant wife a.-id two children
were riding as passengers.

As a result of the collision, Sandra Freestone was

killed and the Holders suffered severe and penranent injuries, for which they later
obtained Jud~t on Augu;t 1, 1980, against William 01arles Dennis for $355,101.44.

:;o appeal was filed on this Judgment.

The policy of insurance issued to William

Charles U:nnis' father by Appellant, GEICO, has policy limits of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per accident.

J:he parties, in the case at bar, stipulated,

prior to the Declaratory Relief trial, dlat at the tiire of the accident, February
~5, 1978, William Charles Dennis was driving a non-owned private passenger auto-

llXlbile wit.11 the permission of the owner of said autorrobile and as a result, the
only question remaining for determination was whether or not William 01arles Dennis
was a resident of his father's household at the tine of the accident, February 25,

l978
..' ':J..7S:

In this regard, the pertine.-it part of the policy in question, states as folSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-10''Persons Insured:
Part I:

''b .

The following are insureds under

With respect to a non-0\'111.ed autorrobile,
(1) the named insured,
(2) any relative, but only with respect to a
private passenger autorrobile or trailer .

The tenn "relative" is defined by the oolicy as follows·
"'?.elative' means a relative of the narred insured,
wno is a resident of the sam: housEhold."
Thus, the sole issue in this lawsuit was w'."1ether the definition of "re::
tive" applied to William Charles Dennis.

In other words, was William Charles CE:.

a resident of his father's household at the tiire of the accident, Februn.ry 25,

~"-

In the recent Annotation at 93 AI.B. 3d, 420-465, entitled 'i·Jho Is '1\esi:c:
Or 'Menber' Of SaTIE 'House.Ji.old' Or 'Family' As l~amed Insured, Within Liabilitv b.

ance Provision Definir,g Adciitional Insureds", d1e author states as folloc·1s.
"Counsel seeking to prove that a particular individual
was a 'residern::' of the sarre 'household' as the named
insured rmy find it helpful to rrake the point, recognized
by nurr.erous Courts, that such terms are arrbiguous and
should, therefor@, be construed in accordance with
general principles of insurance law, in such a manner
as to favor policy coverage. 'fr,e point ltas also been
!TE.de that since the tenilS are to be construed so as to
favor coverage, the cases which have focused upon
those term; in the context of policv clauses excluding liability coverage of an individual found to be
a 'resident' of the narred insured's 'household' are
of little value as precedents in apolying clauses
extending coverage to those to 1vhom the tenilS apnly.
Counsel for an alleged insured rey, therefore, find
it helpful, where such :ases are cited as authority
by opposing counsel, to err.phasize the tendencv of
Courts, in attE!llDting to construe the relevant
tenilS in such a manner as to favor coverage, to apply
those tenilS narrcwly, as opposed to the !7l<:ffL.-ier in
which the same tenns would be aPplied if occurring
in inclusionary policy clauses." (Errphasis added) .
The cases cited by .~pellant, GEICO, in its Brief, are not livi.--ig ivi~
clusion cases, as is the case at bar, but arc= either living apart inclusion case"
exclusion cases, and hence, of "little value as precedents i;:i applv clauses
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-11It is vitally :important, therefore, at the outset to ascertain whether the
cases being cited are living with inclusion cases, living apart inclusion cases, or
exclusion cases.

1\n inclusion case is one where a person is attanpting to "include"

hilr.self as a resident of t.1-ie narred insured's household and hence, an additional insured under the oolicy, as in the case at bar; \lhereas, an exclusion case is one
•,ihere the insurance canpany is atteIJ?ting to "exclude" from coverage a person who
is a relative resident of the nar.ed insured's household, so that such a person canr.ot see the narred insured or other relative residents of his household.

Appellant,

GEICO, uses the same policy definition for the tenn "resident of the I1aI02d insured's
iiousehold" for both situations, i.1clusion and exclusion.

Naturally, insurers would

orefer to have the tenn narrowly interpreted in inclusion cases and broadly interpreted in exclusion cases, as Appella..1t argues in the case at bar.

Notwithstanding

che insurance cor:ipany 's preference, since, the insurance coo;iany sdected the temri.nol.ogy "resident of the na.-red insured' s household", which alrrost all Courts have
said is arliiguous, the Courts have construed said term "in accord.&1ce with general
crinciples of insura..1ce law, in such a rrmmer as to favor policy coverage" .

1

Consequently, in u.'-ie "inclusion" cases, the questioned te:rm is broadly
interpreteci, while, in the "exclusion" cases, t.'le te:rm is given a TIJJCh nnre
restricted interpretation.

Such a dichotany is necessary, because in both situa-

tions, the Courts prefer the interpretation in favor of coverage.

Indeed, one

Court has stated:
''The Courts have uniformlv held that where the clause
is one of inclusion, it should be broadly construed for
d1e benefit of the insured, ,Jhile in exclusion cases,
the same clause is give..ri a nnre restricted interpretation. This is necessary because ii.1 both situations

1nie l'tah Suprerr:e Court has stated:
"We recognize the validity of t.'-ie rule that i f an
i:-isurance policy is arrbiguous or uncertain, so that
it is fairlv susceutible of differe.i.1t interpretations,
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-12u.~e Courts favor an interpretation in favor of coverage. The touchstone is that the phrase 'resident of
the sarne household' has ·;~absolute or precise meaning,
and, if doilit exists as to the extent or fact of coverage, the lai.-iguage used in l!DSt policies will be uI1derstood in its rrost inclusive sense. "2

In this same regard, the California Suprane Court, in Hardware: ltttual

Casua~:

Corrpany v. Home Inderrnity Corrpany, 50 Cal. Rptr. 608, 241 C .A. 2d 303, (1966) , stated
"'.Ihese quoted terms ('resident' and 'household') have
no absolute rreaning
'Insofar as the cases involve
insurance policies, they can be roughly divided into
cases involving policies excluding from coverage of s.l-ie
policies, rrenbers of the insured' s hous ffiold, and tr.ose
extendi.-ig coverage to such persons. Both attempt to
apply the rules of construction above discussed. As a
result, in the extension cases, the auestioned terms
are broadly interpreted, while in the exclusion cases,
the sarre terms are given a much ITDre restricted interpretation. This is necessary, because in both situations, the Courts favor an interoretation in favor of
coverage. ' Finally, after a discussion of a nurrber of
cases, our opinion concluded: 'These cases illustrate
that u.~e interpretation of the tenns involved is not
fixed, but varies according to the circumstances of the
case. They also demonstrate that IIIJst Courts will interpret the terms so as to extend the coverage if this
can be done 1.IDder any reasonable interpretation of the
facts.'"
notwithstanding the fact that the case at bar is a living with inclusion case
and the terms "resident of the named insured' s household" should receive a liberal intec·
pretation, all of the cases cited by Appellant in its Brief in support of its contentio".
that "intention" is relevant ai1d material and creates an issue for the jury to resolve, 2
either living anart inclusion cases, wnere the alleged insured was not livin<ewith the
named insured at the tirre of the accident, 1.Jut living in a separate household, or~

cases, ·where the Courts have applied aver-; strict interpretation to the ten;; "residento:i--...
the named insured' s household".

Li the "exclusion" cases , the Courts have held that bef:

the insurance company can "exclude" a person from coverage as a relative resident o:

2i3uclclin v.

Hation<lde Mutual Insurance Company, 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E. 2d 633

(1967).
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-13the nared insured's household, the insurance company must prove that such a person ·.vas

mt "a resident of the narr.ed insured' s household" under a restricted

i:iterpretation 1'*1.ere sxh a person would be a resident of the narred insured' s
l1ousehold, only if such persons "intended duration was likely to be silistantial,
where it is consistent with the infonnality of the relationship a.-id from which
it is reasonable to conclude that t."te parties would consider the relationship
i;1

contracting about such TIBtters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance
~

thereon ' ' ' -'
In the case at bar, an inclusion case, the Appellant, GEICO, atterrpted

to have G.'-ie Court apply a restrictive interpretation on the term "resident of
thenarreciinsured's househola", as set forth in Maca, Parmerin, and Granillo, supra.
i·lnile Appella.rit did not fully succeed, Appellant was successful to the extent

of r.-aking the "intentions" of \·lilliam Charles I:emis and his father an issue for
the jur; by having: the Court add the following language to Instruction I'b. 14:
"The intended duration must be determined after a
thorough exarri.ination of all the relevant facts
and circumstances surrounding the relationship.
A person ' s in ten ti on at the time in ues tion,
be express or ir:pli
or both.
Errphasis adde
This pare: of the Instruction was contrary to t.'1e Court's earlier observation that
c.'ie only ti.Ire a person's intention niay be probative or rraterial in an inclusion
case, is where the person is living apart from the nam2d insured in a separate
residence at the time of the accident; ho;.;ever, where the person is living with
i:he nameu insured at ci·1e tirr.e of the accident, as in the case at bar, then as the

3
.see ~:ational farrrers Lnion Property & Cas. Co. v. M3.ca, 25 Wisc. 2d 399, 132 tJ.W.
~~ '.ili (1965), an exclusion case; Pamperin v. Milwaukee M.itual Insurance Co
JJ \\iis. 2d 27, 197 ~M 2d 753 (1972 , an inc usion case, which followed Maca, which
is one of the fow cases in whidt the Court expressed the view that the tenr.s "resicent" and "household" are unarrbiguous and that it r:'.Ekes no difference whet.'1er the
Policy used the tenns to include uersons as insureds or to exclude persons from coverage; and :ationwide M.itual Insur<filce Company v. Granillo, 573 P2d 80 (Arizona, 1977),
3Tl exclusion case, 1..hich followed Parr:nerin and ~!aca.
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-14trial Court stated, "it doesn't rrake any difference whether he intended co go
sorr.e place at some future time or not".

(Tr. 427) .

1be Court's initial observation that "intent" is onlv a factor in cast.'
where the person is living apart from the narred insureci in a separate residence
at the time of the accide..1t, is supported by the case la1·1 in inclusion cases, as
well as the author of the current Annotation at 93 AIR 3d 420, who sumnarized

t:~,

law as follows:
"In cases involving an alleged insured who was living
apart from the narred insured at the relevant tirrE, such
alleged insured's intention in living separately from
the narred insured rrav be an imPortant consideration in
determining such person s stat:Us as a 'resident' of t.1e
narred insured's 'household'." (Emphasis added).
In Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10, Appellant cites the sarre Annotaticn,

93 AIR 3d 420, but cites only a preliminary staterrent in the Annotation tl1at sets
forfo all the factual considerations that the Courts have used in both i:cclGSio2
and exclusion cases to determine whether or not a verson is a resident of t:.'-ie ran
insured' s household.

93 AIR 3d 424.

While all those factual consideratior.s ha1:e

been used by the Courts, Appellant does not point out, as the author does, r.l-iat
whether or not all or just some of those facts are relevant for consideration depends on the type and nature of t:.'-ie case, such as whether it is an "inclusion"
case or an "exclusion" case, anci whether or not the alleg"!d ins•zed is Evi.-.g
with the narred insured or living apart from the nam2d insured in a separate house·
hold,

at the time of the accident.

93 ALR 3d 427.

LI fact, i.rrr:iediateb follo.i-

ing the lai.1guage cited by Appellai1t, the author states as follo;vs.
"A significant portion of the cases focusing upon one
or IIDre of the policy teTIIB under consideration have
involved a child of the narred insured. Where such
child was sta ing w"ith the nar;-eJ insured durin:c; a ,eriod
that :L.1cluded
e date o the accident or other occur:"e.rice
giving rise to the oontroversy conceming the child s
status, Courts have held, on the basis of a varietv
of circumstances, t.l-iat the child qualified as a 'resident'
or rrerrber' of the narred i.J.1Sured s household
Suen
results have been reached desnite circ:urrstanc2s that
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-15over the age of mjority.
added) .

Section 5, infra."

(Emphasis

'he cases cited under Section 5 are classified under the heading:
..med Insured".

"Child Living With

In every case cited where a child was living with the named insured

at the time of the accident, including where t.'1e child had separate living arrangements
during a prior period or 'vhether the child was over the age of rrajority, t.'1e Court
found t.'1at the child was a resident of the n.3ID2d insured' s household.

In the case

ac oar, which also inwlves a child living with the named insured fat.'ier, where the
child

~vas

over the age of rrajority, age 23, t.1-te Court co=ectly detenrri.ned, as a mat-

cer of laJ, that the only reasonable inference to be dra;m from such facts was that
\·lilliam Charles Jennis was a reside.1t of his father's household at the tim2 of the
accident, February 25, 1978, and he:\C3, an additional insured under his policy of
liability insurance .
..onvithstanciing the fact that the case at. bar is a living with inclusion
case, Gr::ICD, cites four living apart inclusion cases and three exclusion cases in
support of its position.

Appellant fails to cite one living with inclusion case,

oecause there are none that support its position, and Appellant fails to alen: the
Court as to the type of case inwlved, or as to the facts of the case.

Respondents

subr.ti.t that it is important for the Court to kru:M the type of case and the facts
of each case ':Jefore the Court can determine its value as a precedent.

To assist the

Court in this regard, Respond&-its have prepared the following chart, ,,ti.ich divides

the cases cited by the parties into living with inclusion cases, living aoart inclusion cases, and exclusion cases, gives the name, state, and date of the case, a brief

statEment of the facts, states whether or not the case is one that i:wolves a child
or relative living with the named insured or whether the child was living apart fa
a separate household at the time in question and whether or not the Court considered
intention as an issue and sets forc~1 the decision of the case.
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-16LIVING WI'IH Arm i,IVmG APART

mausron CASES

(Liberal Internretation Of Resident)
(Jury Question And Intent An Issue Oniy If Living Apart In A Separate House.'1old .>
Time Of Accident)

~

Dennis
(Utah)

1980

Jury Question
And Intent

Facts

Case

-

Decision

Sen livingwith father
for threeITOnths before
accident.

I
'lot a jury question.
µury, not a reside'.'.:
Intended duration an
Trial Court grantee
issue, (out should not
Judgrrent ;; .0 . V
[have been an issue)-.PJ'..S Im:r:rr
Not living aoar'c L< separate house.ltold at tim=
of accident.

i~ephav

living with uncle for two rronths before accident.

Not a jury question.
Intended duration :;OT
an issue.
lbt living a_Eart in separate household at tim=
of accident,

Jury, not a reside:-:
Appellate Court h2;.
trial Court shoulci·1
granted Judgrrent •• f
RESIDEt!I
i

Nephew living with uncle for one nnnth before accident.

~;Qt

a jury question.
Intended duration -:;or
an issue.
rlot living aoart in separate household at time
of accident.

:lo jury.
RESIDEIIT

Not a jury question.
Intended duration 1:o'f
an issue.
tbt living a.2art in separate household at tlire
of accident.

[;Q

No jury was requested.
Intent of daugc'"lter to teI'
rninate residency at father' s was an issue.
Living a12art in separate
household at tin1e of
accident.

~b

[l 1

6 (ScuthBuddin
Carolina)
~

1967

§

d
;::::;
p IT Hardwe.re
I='
,.,.
(California)
c.:

1966

~

....:i

-

,..

!

~

3
Jamestown
(l~on:h Carolina)
1966

29-year-old divorced
son living with father
for two weeks before
accident.

~:

If
Cf)

li.l

Mi.one
(Colorado)
l97Y.

~
~
Cf)

~

Q 15
;:::;
H

~

~

~
H

....:i

~

19-year-old daughter
left home to live with
Fiancee. Father directed insurer to take
<laugher off policy before accident.

jury.
RESIDE Tl

J

f

jury.
:\ITT A R:SIDEi:;

I~
~
lo

Can be resident Jf;
Father had two seoarate Jury question.
separate hou:::eho:~
households , one ~ere
Intended duration -::OT
sisters lived and raised an issue.
his son, and one where
Living a12art in s epa he lived.
rate household at tine
.
Jur1 noc a res1cc .. ·,
1966
Was Father resident of
of accident.
Reve~sed. RES~·
sisters' household?
:Jo jury, not a res ..
1967
Was Law
son
resident
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-17LIVIlfu Willi A!:ill i.IVIlfu APART IilCLuSION CASES CXXITINL'ED
(Liberal Interpretation Of Resident)
(Jury Ouestion And Intent An Issue Only If Living /\part In A Separate Household At
Tirre Of Accident)
Jury Question
And Intent

Facts

Case

Married mir.or son liv- Jury question.
ing in anart:Eent at
Intent as to which houseschool, whowas suppor- [hold he was a resident of
teci by fatherVJho had
/was an issue.
room at fat.'Ler' s house Living apart in separate
anC: kept clot.'Les there household at time of accident.

iteans
10Uahorm.)
~967

21-year-old daughter,
living in apartrrent
who's father augmented
incor:-e and VJho had room
at father's house.
Agent told father she
was resident and covered by father's policy.

Halker
(Utah)

1971

NJ jury requested.
Intent as to VJhich household she was a resident of
was an is sue .
Living apart in separate
house.l-iold at tirr'.e of acddent.

Decision

µury,

PJ:.SIDTh'T of fa)ther' s household.
p-ury question.

lo jury' RESIDENI of
father's household.

aa..usm: msrs
(Strict Interpretation Of Term "Resident")
Facts

Case

Gr;millo
(.\rizo!kl)

1977
?died on
~erin)

Pamoerin
8·Jiscmsin)
1972
~1clusion case,
Jtrelied on
~·an excluton case.

Intent An Issue

Decision

Married daughter lived
with parents. Going
to IIDve to an apartr.ent
(wanted to sue brother).
Been there one IIDnth before accident.

L'1tended duration an issue l'b jury, 1-DT A RESIDEHI'.
llot a resident if earlv ter- (She could sue brother).
minaeion highly probable.
Pesident only if stay is long
enough that parties would
take relationship into consideration in contracting
for L-isurance.

Single niece stayed
wi.th uncle to care for
children from end of
Sumner session to beginning of Fall session. Been there 10
days before accident.

Intended duration an issue !Jury, resident, reverresident if early ter- sed, N)T A RESIDEi.'<1'.
mination hi¢ily probable.
Resident only if stay is long
enough that parties would
take relationship into consicieration in contracting
for irsurance.
~:Ota

',

~aca

----

Intended duration an issue. Ir-lo jury, i·DT A RESIDIJIT.
t:ot a resident if early ter- (He could sue father).
mina ti on highly probable.
Resident only if stay is long
enough t.11at parties would
take relationship into consideration in contracting
for insurance.
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-18A review of the foregoing chart clearly shows that under the facts of c·
case at bar, an "inclusion" case, where a d1ild, William Qi.arles Dennis, was livi:
with his narred insured fatl1er at the time of the accident and not living aDart ir
separate household at the time of the accident, that "intention" is not relevant i
or material, and hence, there are no issues for a jury to resolve, and that in al:
cases, with facts similar to the case at bar, the Courts have held, as a matter o:
law, that the child or relative was a resident of the named insured's household.
It is also clear that Appellant, GI:ICO, has irrproperly atterrpted to have
this O:iurt, as it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the law of "exck
sion" cases, where a strict interpretation is applied to the term "resident of t'ie
same household".

As the author of the Annotation oointed out, "exclusion" cases I

"are of little value as precedents in applyic-i.g clauses exter>.ding coverage to those
to whom the tenn applies".

93 AIR 3d 427.

In addition, it is clear that Appellant, GEICO, has illllJroperly attempte:

to have this Court, as it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the la'
of "inclusion" cases vb.ere the child or relative was "living apart" from the

!

ruirec I

insured in a separate household at the time of the accident, which is contrary to
and different fran the facts in the case at bar.

\'1hile in sum "living apart" cas;

the "alleged insureds' intmtion in living separately from the narred insured r.ay ·:,
an important consideration in determining such persons status as a 'resident' of'
named insured's househcld"

(93 AIR 3d 427) and hence, create an issue to be resol;

by a jury, the case at bar is not a "living apart" case and thus, "intention" is,.,
relevant or material and hence, there are no issues for the jury to resolve

Lncq

the uncontroverted facts of the case at bar, as the trial O:iurt initially observeG
"it doesn't make any difference whether the alleged insured irn:ended to go some
else at sane future ti.me or not''.

(Tr. 427) .

The cases set forth on t11e chart are now discussed, in detail, ic< the
following
pages:
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In Budd.in, a living with inclusion case, which is directly in point,

a nephEW, who, being uner;iployed, nuved into the h=e of his bachelor uncle and
lived there from August, 1965, until the accident of October 10, 1965, a period of
about two nunths , who received nuney from his uncle to purchase food and clothing
when he needed it and help from him to find a job, who, when err.ployed, rm.de token
weekly contributions toward household expenses, who was not restricted to any part

of the house, and was not looking for another place to live, was found by a jury
oot to be a "resident of the sane household", as his relative uncle and thus, not
entitled to liability coverage as an additional insured under his uncle's autOIIDbile insura."lce policy.

The nephEW' s

was his i'btion For Judgment

~btion

~Jotwithstanding

For A Directed Verdict was denied, as
The Verdict.

The Supreme O:Jurt reversed

the jury verdict and Juc!grrent, holding as follrus:

"The insured oolicv here included Horace E. Budd.in as
the nam:d izlSUred and as an additional insured 'any
re la tive resident of the same household' . Arrj person
qualifying: as a resident of the S3[Jl€ household of the
insured is an additional insured under the policy.
The policy here is one that extends coverage and
includes as an insured, any relative resident of
the sarne housffiold and is not a clause excluding
from coverage a relative resident of t.'"ie same household. 'ilie O:Jurts have unifonnly held that where
the clause is one of bclusion, it should be broadlv
construed for the benefit of the insured, while
in exclusion cases the same clause is given a nnre
restricted interpretation. Jamestown Mutual
Insur&ice O:Jmoany v. 1;ationwide "t1.ltual Insurance
O:Jrnpany, 266 ~'l. C. 430 , 146 S. W. 2d 410. This is
necessary because in both situations, the O:Jurts
favor an interpretation in favor of coverage. The
touchstone is that the phrase 'resident of t.'1e same
housffiold' has no absolute or precise rreaning, and,
if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage,
the language used in nnst policies will be understood
in its nust inclusive sense. American Universitv
Insurance O:Jrrpanv v. Thorrpson, 62 Wash. 2d 595, 384
p .2d 367. fl

"L-1. our opinion, under the cases cited, there were no
factual issues in this case for the jury to resolve.
The evider.ce here is susceptible of onlv one reasonable
inference.
ThisLawbeing
tnle,
the O:Jurt
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-20ded the issue as a ITBtter of law and given to the inclusion clause contained l l l the policy here in question a
broad and liberal construction. He should have held
that the orily reasonable rnference to be drawn from the
testimmv was that Alton Buddin, Jr., was a relative
resident. of the same household as was Horace .SuddiI1, his
uncle. It follows that Alton Buddin, Jr., was an additional icl.Sured under the policy issued by the Respondent
to Horace Budclin.
The Judgrrent of the lower G::lurt is reversed and this
case remanded thereto for entry of Judgment in favcr of
the Appellants in accordance with their f'btion For A
Directed Verdict." (Er'q:>hasis added).
In Buddin, the Plaintiff insurance companv argued that there were facD.;a__
issues for the jury's detennination, to wit:

(1) the issue of payment of rent ar.c

board while the nephe;v was in his uncle's household, (2) whether the uncle exercis,

any degree of control over his nephEW, and (3) that there was a lack of a pemaner:/
living arrange.'!Ent between t.'1e persons alleged to be residents of the sar.e househ::.
Appellant, GEICO, in the subject case, rrade this sarne arguirent with respect to "!:
the lack of a pe=ent living arranga:nent a.Tld the subjective or declared intent«:.
respect thereto".

In the Buidin Court's opiclion, these were not proper issues for

jury's detenni.1'.ation ic1 deciding ,..nether the nephsv was a relative resident of ths
same housffiold as his uncle.

I

Although there had been testirrony concerning the fac.

that the nephsv had "no intentions of rrDving", the G::lurt did not consider it rnte=J
or relevant.

Specifically, in response to Plaintiff insurance compai.1y 's argumenc

relative to intent, the Court stated as follows:
"The fact that there was a lack of a permanent living
arrangement between the persors alleged to be residenLS
of the same household is not determir.ative of the issue.
Hewcomb v. Great 1'.rrerican Insurance G::l. , 260 :i. C. 402,
133 S.E. 2d 3; Hardware Mutual Casual5tj Companv v. Home
Indernity G::l., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, ) Cal P.ptr. 508;
and Jamestown Mutual LT'\surance
a
v. 11atioiwlide
Mutual Insurance G::l., L'.
l~.C.
30, 1
S.E. d 410.
In the HardWare Mutual Casualty CoITlllany case, it aopears
that a nephsv was living rvith his aunt and uncle in the
same household on the day of the accident and had been
for a substantial period of tirre before and after it
'ilie Court in holding that the nephew was an additional
insured under the policy issued to his uncle ai.<d aunt,
said:
'We think that a resident of the same household
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-21who lives together wit.'1 others in the sarre house for
a period of some duration, alchough he rray not intend
to rermin there penr.anentl y. '"
The Buddin Court cited and relied upon the very language which the trial
Court used in Instruction

~b.

1'+, to instruct the jury concerning the definition

of the word "resident", to wit:
"A 'resident of the sarre household' within an autonnbile policy extendir.g coverage on a non-owned autonnbile to anv relative who is a resident of the sarre
household :i.s the narred insured ITEanS one, other than
a tanporary or transienc visitor, who lives together
with others in the sam= house for a period of sorre
duration, al~ough he rray not intend to rermin there
per03I1ently.

lhe Bud din Court ruled therefore, that, based upon the above law, which the
trial Court also used as the law and so instructed the jury, the subjective or declared intent of the relative is "not a orouer issue for the jury's dEtennination in
deciding whether (the relative) was a resident of the sarre household as (the naIJEd
insured)".
2.

The above

lan~ge,

as to the definition of the word "reside.'1t", was

first cited in Hardware Mutual, supra, a living with inclusion case.

There, the

Court held that a nephEW, who was living with his aunt and uncle in the same household on the day of the accident, was a re1ative "resident of the same household"
and thus, an additional insured under the policy issued to the uncle and aunt.
Jiere, the nephEW, himself, testified that he was not living with his aunt and
uncle at the t~ of t.'le accident and that he actually had lived in an apartment
with his cousin fran early 1960, until June 15, 1961, a period of about a year and

a half.

His cousin, however, testified that although he shared the apartmmt

with the nephEW beg:L.'1ning L< early 1960, he did not see much of the nephew during
June, 1961, because the nepha" was staying with his aunt and uncle.

The cousin

also staced t.'lat the nephE'W had some clothes with him when he started staying with
his aunt anci uncle ir, June, 1961, al though he still had some of his clothes in the

Jparurent.
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-22prior to the accident, was a little less t.'1an one IDJnth (June, 1961).

Hcwever,

when arrested and whe..ri treated at the hospital , the nephsv gave, as his address ,
that of his a\IDt and \IDcle.

Also, he used his a\IDt and ll:lcle 's address on his

driver's license and car registration.

Under such facts, the Court held, as a

matter of law, that the nephew was a resident of his \IDcle 's household at the tire
of the accident.
3.

L-1 Jarrestown Hutual, a living with inclusion case, the Court held,

as a matter of law, that the narred insured's 29-year-old son, who had been living
with his father for about two weeks at the tilre of his involvanent in a mtor
vehicle collision, who was separated from his wife, had no home of his own, ate
his meals at his father's house, slept there, had his la\IDdry done with the farriil:
laundry, had the run of the house and ;:>aid no board, was a "resident of the sarre
household" as his father, despite the fact that t.'1e son had previously lived in
other places and had returned to his faber's hOUJe with ti.'-ie intention of ultirmtel
finding a room in a boarding house.

The Court pointed out that:

"the word 'resideLJ.t' has many shades of rreariing, ranging from = e temporary presence to the most penranent
abode, and that when an insurer uses a 'slippery' word
to designate those 1vho are L.JSured by the oolicv, it
is not the Court's :function 'to sprinkle sand \.IDon the
ice' by construing the term strictly."
TI1us, in the Buddin case, where the relative had lived with t.'1e nameci
insured for about two ront.'1s, in the P.arct1are Mutual case, where the relative had
lived with the narred irnured for about one IDJnth, and in the Jarresta.m i"!Jtual case
mere t.'1e relative had lived with the narred insured for only two weeks, each O:iurt
held, as a matter of law, that because the relative or child was living with the
named insured at the time of the accident and not living apart in a separate house·
hold, the relative or child was a resident of the named insi.rred' s household.

Tue

holding of each case was based ~on the sane definition of the word "resident" as
was used to instruct the jury in the case at bar (excluding t:1e part mich improve:.
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1.

-23instructed the jury to determine Dennis' intended duration).

In the case at bar,

t.'1e child had lived wid1 the narred insured for about iliree rronths prior to me accident, which is longer than t.11e tin= spent in the Buddin, 1-l..ardware Mutual, or
Jairestown ti1tual cases.
In Words And Phrases, 1979 Cur.mulative Annual Pocket Part, the term "resident of the sarre household" is listed, whereas in the pennanent volume, me term
"resident of d1e same household" is not listed.

Thus, the 1979 Cwrnulative Annual

Pocket Part gives all me cases cited under this term.

It should be noted mat all

three living with inclusion cases referred to above, Buddin, P.ardware M..itual, and
James tc:wn .Mutual are cited thereunder.
Appellant, GEICO, takes a position contrary to that of the living wim inclusion cases of 13uddin, Hardware M.itual, and Jamestown Mutual anci relies on four
living apart inclusion cases and iliree exclusion cases in support of its position
that d1e subjective or declared intent of William Charles Dennis was a factual issue
for the jury's determination in deciding wheilier or not William Cnarles Dennis was
or was not a resident of his famer 's household.

'Ihe four living aoart inclusion

cases are Urri.ted Services Autorrobile Association v . .Mione, 528 P2d 420 (Colo., 1974),
~.ardescv

v. State Farm Mutual AutolllJbil2 Insurance Coypany, (CA 10 Okla.) 382 F2d 564

(19G7) and 361 Fed. 2d 176 (1966), Aetna Casualty C.. Surety Corrpany Of Hartford, Con.

v. li:ans, 382 F2d 26 (1%7), and American States Insurance Company, Western Pacific
)ivision v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P2d 1042 (1971), and d1e iliree exclusion cases
are liatiorwide Mutual Insurance O?l!lpanv v. Granillo, 573 P2d 80 (Arizona, 1977),
Paqierin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ir.surance Ccmpany, 197 N.W. 2d 783 (Wis., 1972), anci
;;,tional Farmers Lhlon Propertv & Casualty Ccmpany v. Maca, 132tl.W. 2d517 (1965).
4.

In Mione, a living anart inclusion case, on Uovenber 8, 1971, the

relative, Jea.'1 .Mione, d1en 19 years of age, left her parents hor.1e following a
family dispute to live at her fiancee' s apartment until their marriage.

At the

time, Jean gave to her father, d1e keys to the house and did not return, except
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-24to pi.ck up some personal belongings.

She was employed while living with her oanj

and continued her employment thereafter.

On cioverrber 17, 1971, :1er father direcc,

his insurer, the Plaintiff, to exclude Jean from the poli.cv a.rid this was done e£:,'
ti.ve i;overrber 19, 1971.

On :;overnber 21, 1971, Jean was driving her fiancee 's aut '

mobile, when she was involved in an accident.

Because Jean was living apart in,

I

separate household at the ti.me of the acci.de..ct, the Court stated:
"Important factors (to detenni.ne if one rr.ay be considered the resident of a household) are the subjective
or declared intent of the indi.vich.ial, the relacionshi.p
between the Lcdivich.ial and the merrbers of the household,
the existence of a second place of lodging and the relative pennanei--i.ce or transient nature of the individual's
residence in the household."
The Court held that "Jean intended to and did, in fact, terminate her
residency in her parent's home prior to the accident''.

The matter of intent arosi

primarily in connection with the question of whether or not Jean had terminated
her residency with her parents.
5.

There is no such question in the subject case.

Ir:! Hardesty, a living apart inclusion case, the question was 1·iheti'ie

or not a son was a resident of his father's household at the ti.me of the accider:c

I

The son resided at 6827 t;orth Trenton and the policy recited that the named insur0 I
father's residence was also 6827 l·brth Trer.~>n, but the father rraintai.ned a,1d frcquently occupied another house nearby.

The father had n..'O unmarried sisters, whc

lived at 6827 i;orth Trenton, who raised his son from his youth.

'Ihe utilities 1-:e,
'

in the narre of the father, a.rid he paid all the bills.

The father was regi.sterec:

vote from that address, received his rm.i.l there, and was listed in the telephone
book there.

He ate rreals there or at a restaurant.

The Tenth Ci.rcui. t reversed

a jury verdict that found the father was not a resident of 6827 r:orth 'Irenton at
the tira= of the accident, because of an i..rrproper jury instruction that stated a
person could be a rrarber of rore than one household, provided each house:cold has:
single head and single rro.nageme.'1t.

Til.e Court said the jury was left with t:he

unmistakeable
inference
that
there
could
bebybut
oneof Museum
household
6827 ::orth 'Cre.'l
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-25which was erroneous .
hold at 682 7

~:Orth

'.Jie Court held the father could have had a separate house-

Trenton.

On rerrand, the Court held, as a rratter of law, that the son was a resi-

dent of the household of the two sisters at G827 forth Trenton and not the fat.'1er's
household there.

Again, the Tenth Circuit reversed, this tirre stating as foll<Ms:

'We must again reverse. In Aetna Casualty And SureRI
Company v. l!ean,s, 382 F. 2d 26, 1967, this Court he
that a son might be a resident of two households
stating that the v.urds 'resident of the same household'
as contained in an insurance policy, do not constitute
a term of art which would dictate a oarticularized
legal inference to be drawn from family relationships."
The Court held that the rratter should be submitted to a jury, because the folloong
facts were such that different permissible inferences could be drmm therefrom:
"Ennis, Jr., was the minor son of Fnnis, Sr., and in his legal custody by virtue
of a Divorce Decree; Ennis, Jr., resided in a house where Fnnis, Sr., ll'aintained a
household and had been allov:ed to drive a car belonging to his father both before
and after the accident; father and son took their rreals together; Fnnis, Sr., had,

from time to time, contributed in part to the cost of food at 'lrenton Street; had
?rovided his son with srrall aroounts of spenciing rroney and occasionally helped to
provide clot.'"ling; and had exercised some parental control over his son".

All those

facts supported the proposition that the son was a resident of his father's household, which was contrary to the Court's ruling.
Based on the holdi.ri.g in the Hardestv case, William Charles Dermis could
:-Cave had two residences for insurance purposes, the one in Utah, where he lived

with his father during the three rronth period prior to the accident, and the one
with the unk:n<Mn address in Florida, where he had lived with his unkn<Mn girlfriend
for the one rronth period prior to his return to Utah.
0.

In M:ans, a living apart inclusion case, where a minor son was living

apart from the named insured at the relevant time, rraintaining a separate residence
in an apartment with his wife, while attenciing school and who had mt 1ived at his
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-26father's hone since his marraige, but who was supported by his father giving hiJ:J
$150. 00 per month end who had a room in his father's home, '1bic;1 was always avail-

able to him and kept clothes in the closet of his room, the question was whet.'ler
or not the son was a resident of his father's household at G'le time of an accident.

i!otwiths tanding the fact that t.1-ie father and the son both testified that

the son was not a resident of the father's household, the jury found that the
son was a resident of the father's house,.'1old.

The Tenth Circuit held, as it hac

previously done iil the Hardesty case, supra, tbat:
"an insured i.mder an autorrobile liability policy could
legally maintain ITTJre than one hoU5ehold. So, we thin1<
..
a ma=ied son might be a rrerrber of his father's household a...-id at the sam= time, be the head of his own household."
Ll accordance therewith, the Court affirrred the jury verdict a.T"\d the decision of
the lower Court denying the 1-'btion For Judgrrent lbtwithstanding The Verdict.

ille

Court pointed out that:
'"lhere are ma..-iy cases where a contract of insurance
may be cons trued as a matter of law and the question
of liability vel non decided as such by the Court.
There are other cases where there is a conflict in
the evidence or where different inferences are permissible under uncontroverted evidentiarv facts. In
the latter kind of situations, the issue" is a fact
issue and one which is oroperly submitted to the jury."
Appellant insurance company, GEICO, has s true tured its argi..men t and
Brief, as if the facts of the case at bar presented a situation similar to the
decision in the Means case, where the Court set forth, in one column, "the evidence favoring the position of w'1e Plaintiff" insurance company (that M::ans was
not a resident of his father's household, but of a household where he lived with
his wife) and in another colum, "the evidence favoring the position of tile
Defendants (the injured Claimants, that Means was a resident of his father's hoi.:si·
hold), just as Appellant insurance canpany has done in the case at bar.

In the

Means case, the Court determined that "there are factors in this case, pointing
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-27as to G'l.e inferences to be drawn presented a fact issue" and thus, "it was properly

subrnitteci co the jury".
out is that in the

~~r.s

What Appellant insurance company, GEICO, fails to point
case, unlike die case at bar, the alleged insured, a minor

son, who haci not lived with his father since his rrarriage, was living apart from
his father in a separate household with his wife, while he was attending school,
at the ti.Ire of the accicient.

The injured Claimants atterr:pted to show that he was

a resicient of his father's household at the tir:'e of the accident, because he was
being supported by his father, and he had a rooll'. available to hin1 at his father's
house and had clothes in the closet of that room.

Because the case involved a child

•.iho was living aoart from the I1a!l1Pd isisurec father, in a separate household, at the time of
the accident, the Ccurt received testirrony of the parties' intention, which was to
the effect that neither the father or the son considered the son to be a resident
of the father's house..'lold.

The jury cietermined that the son was a residei.1t of his

father's householci at the time of the accident.
The case at bar dces not involve a son living apart in a separate householci, or even rraintaining a separate household at the time of the accident.

;-:ever-

theless, A,l)pellant insurance company, GEICO, lists two colunns of evidentiary facts
as if the one colurm sets fortl1 t.'le evidence favoring Appellant's position that
Williar:i Charles Dennis was a resident of the apartment in Florida, where William
Q1arles Dennis lived for one IIDnth before returning to Utah, and as if the other
oolum sets forth the evidence favoring Respondent's positio!"l that William iliarles

Dennis was a resicient of his fat.'ler 's household, where he had lived for the !:Pree
months prior to the accident.

P.e.'1ce, Appellant, GEICO, argues it was a jury ques-

tion as to 1vhich household he was a resident of at t.'le tirne of the accident an:i
since che jury determined he was not a resident of his father's household at the
tim= of the accicenc, he must have bee.ri a resident of the apartment household
in Florida.

·,his argunent is fallacious for the following reasons:

First, since

William Qiarles Dennis was not livir1g at t.'-ie aparOIEnt in Florida at the cirre of
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-28the accident, but living with his fafoer, it can be decided, as a rratter of law. :
I

that William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's household at the tiI:.,
of the accident.

i

Under such facts, the parties ' iI1tention is not relevant or

rraterial and hence, tliere is no issue for the jury to resolve

As the Court

stated in Means:
"There are rnanv cases where a contract of insurance may be construed as a rratter of la1v . .
Second, it does not follow logically that William Charles Deniri.s could be a resident of the Florida apart:ri:Ent where he had lived for only one ITDnth before returing to Utah and not be a resident of his father's household where he had lived :c
three rrnnths prior to d1e accident and where he was living on the day of the acc:-j
I

dent.

Again, as the Court stated in Means:
"An insured under an automobile liability policy
could legally maintain rrnre than one housffiold.
So, we think, a married son might be a IIE..rnber of
his father's household and, at the sarre time, be
the head of his own housEhold."

Thus, since a person can be a resident of two se!Jarate households for insurance
coverage purposes, eve..ri assuming arguendo that William Charles Dennis was livi'lg'
or rnaintainL'1g the Florida apartm=nt at the time of the accident, which he was rrc I
he could have been a resident of his father's housEhold, as well as the apartrrer.:
in Florida.

But s:li1ce he was not living at or maintaining the Florida apartrenc

at the time of the accident, William Charles Dennis could only be a resident of
his father's household at the tirne of the accider.t _
7.

In Walker, a Utah living apart ir.clusion case. \mich involves

a daughter living apart in a separate household in Utah at the ti.m= of the accicE'
the Utah Suprem: Court apolied a very liberal definition to the words ''residenc
of the sarrE household" in order to sustain the trial Court's rulir.g tlla.t a 21year-old daughter was a resident of her facher' s household in Id.&10, noL·,vithst2""ding the fact that at the tirne of the accident, she was living in an aparnrenc '
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-29training to be an x-ray technician.

1he Court noted that she had returned home

to Idaho after ead1 college school year, that her parents augrrented her income,
thdt she kept so!l12 furniture, books, and clothinp; in her father's home, that she
had an Idaho driver's license, voted in the Idaho general election, anCl filed
her income tax return in Idaho, and that she considered herself to be a resident
of Idaho anci a resident of [1er father's household.

In atterq:itir.g to apply a

liberal definition to an inclusion case to the words "resident of a househcld"
to

jus ti:6; the lower Court's ciecision that she was a resident of her father's

household in Idaho, even though she was living in Utah at the tine of the accident,
the Court stated as foll=s:
"A resicient of a household is one who is a ITEIIber of
a family who live imder the same roof. Residence emphasizes ITEIIbership in a group rather than an attachment to a building. It is a ll'atter of intention and
choice rather than one of geography.
Ordinarily, when a child is ~ay from home attending
school, he remains a rr.errDer of the family household,
and the question of when he ceases to be such is one
which must be determined from all of the facts and
circurns tanc es as revealed by the evide.rice. "
The Court further noted that the daughter's father had asked his insurance age,.-i.t whether an additional insurance policy should be taken out to cover her
when she left Idaho for training in Uta..11 and "the agent told them she would be
covereci by her father's policy".

As was pointed out by the author of the Annota-

tion 93 AIR 3d 420, at 427, the only reason the Ca.ugher's intention was probative
and relevant, was because the case involved a situation where the

"alleged insured

•.vas livi:.1g apart from the n.aired insured at the relevant tine".

Based on the Walker case, it is respectfully submitted that the Utah
Supreme Court should apply a liberal interpretation to the term "resident of
the saIIE household" ar.d follo:.; t.'1e law. as set forth in the living with inclusion
cases of Bucldin, Hardware i'!utual, and Jamestown ~i.itual. which are all cited in
Words And Phrases under the definition "resident of the same household", and furt:her, that the
Utahby the
Suprerre
should
apoly
a bystrict
to the
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-30tenn "resident of the same household", as used in the exclusion cases.
Appella.-it, GEICO. also argues foat the exclusion cases support i

Ls

posi•.,

that whether an individual is a resident rrerrber of t.'1e farrily household dererJis
upon the transitory or pennanent nature of his stay there and specifically,
claims that where he has intentions of nuving on, an issue of fact is creaced,
which nust be subrritted to t.'1e jury.

In support of this claim, ..1,ppellant. GEICC

relies on the Granillo, PamperiI1, and Hi.ca cases.

8.

'Ihe Granillo case inwlved an exclusion, rrearing that t'.1e Court

applied a strict definitior, to the words "resident of the sarre household", rather
than an inclusion, as the case at bar, rrea.-iirlg that the Court should apply a
liberal definition to the words "resident of the sarre household".

There, the

Court fashioned a strict definition and concluded that a im.rried daughter. who,
with her two children, lived with her parents fran mid or late July, 1975, \.Jr.ti:
the accident of Au,,,aust 16, 1975, a period of about one TIDnth, was not a resident
of her parents' household, and thus, she could sue her brother, who was drivi:ig

'.o

car at the tirre of the accident and was a resident of her parents' household.
The married daug..'1ter had previously lived with her husband in anny-provided hous:'.J
andinadd.ition, therrarried daughter's incent was to look for a job, find a housu
rent it as soon as she could afford to do so.

She planned to be relocated befor0

her aney husband left for Korea in i·:Ovanber, 1975.

The strict definition of

t~e

words ''resident of the sarre household", which the Court fashioned was stated as
follows:
'";.:ationvide stresses that no specific ti.me was stated
for Mary Jean to leave her parents' home and that she
could have stayed there as long as she liked. Living
together 1mder one roof as a family. however, is neither
t.'1e sole mr the controlling test in determi..-iing wheticer
a oerson is a rrerrber of a household. If one ' .
co~ 1mder the family roof for a definite short period
or for an indefinite perioo 1mder such cirCUIIBtances
that an early tenn.L'lation is highly probable' then one
is not a 'rrerrber of the sarre household' . P~erin v.
l:-1ilwaukee t1.ltual Insurance Cor.roa.=iy, 55 Wis. ~d 27, 197
W. 2d
783 Funding
at 787
(1972).
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was here rr.anifested. If a relative lives in ~'e hoce

-31on a tanporary basis, she does not become a men:ber of
the household '"ithin the rreaning of the exclusionary
provision in llatiorwide' s policy.
The intended duration of the relationshio is a fact
to be oonsidered. Pamperin, supra. 'The intended duration should be
long enough so that it is reasonable to expect the parties to take the relationship into
consideration in contracting about such matters as L-isurance or in their conduct in reliance thereon.' :-lational
FarnErs Union Prooer
& Casual ColliDan v. Maca, 26 His.
~d 9 , l.;L ~i.W.
d 5
5 1
Emphasis added).
lhe above strict defL'lition of t..'-ie words "resident of the sarre household"
is cl1e very definition which Appellant, GEICO, sought to irrpose on William Olarles
Dermis fr, the case at bar.

To the extent that intent was incorporated into the

Court's instructions to the jury re la tive to the words ''resident of the same household",. Appella...'lt, GEICXl, succeeded, as previously discussed, supra.

The strict

definition of the words "resident of the same household", which was used in the
exclusion case of Granillo, was taken from the Wisconsin case of Panperin, which
e..xtracted the strict definition from the i7isconsin case of Maca, which is also an
exclusion case.
9.

In Parrperin, a 20-year-old single woman, after a Sumrer session at

college, went to stay with her uncle and to take care of his children due to an
illness L1 t.'-ie fa!!lily.
in the Fall.

She rroveci inco the house, planning to return to school

About 10 days after rmving in, the woman was involved in an autorro-

bile accident driving a car owned by her =ther.

The jury found the woman was a

resident of her uncle's household, but the Wisconsin Suprane Court reversed,
holding that, as a matter of law, the woman was not a resident of the household.
As previously discussed and pointed out by the author of 93 AI..R 420 at 427, Pam-

eerin, infra, "is one of the fsv cases in which the Court e.'qlressed the view
chat the terms 'resident' a...'ld 'household' are unambiguous, and that in applying
those terms it r;akes no difference whether the policy used the terms to include
~ersous

as insureds, or to exclude persons fra;i coverage".
10.

In r'hca, an exclusion case, where a 32-year-old son had been livi..'"lg
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-32with his father on a fann, which was a requirerrent of his eq:iloyrrent there,
for a period of five rronths prior to the accident, the Court a;iplied a strict
L.-tterpretation to the term "resident of the sane household" and held t..'1at
since an early tei:m:L.'18.tion of the son's living with his father v!as highly probable and because the son's intended duration was not long enough for the
parties to take the relationship into consideration in contracting about such
matters as insurance, the son was not a resident of his father's household, so

t';

son was not excluded from insurance coverage, and he could sue the father for r.:-,,
injuries he received as a result of an accident on his father's farm.
Since the case at bar is a living with inclusion case, a liberal defiti'.
tion should be applied to the words "resident of the sarre household" and the la.·
as set forth in the living with inclusion cases of Buddin (relative lived with
narred L-isured for two rronths), !laI&tJare 11utual (relative lived with narred insure:
for one rronth), a...-id Jarrestovm Hutual (relative lived with named L-isured for c,;o
weeks), where the Courts respectively detennined that a relative, who had lived
with the nmred insured for a two-rronth period, a one-rronth period, and a tlvo-wee,
period, were each TIDre than "a tEr.JpOrary or transient visitor" and each had livec
in the sane house "for a period of some duration", even though there was no
"intent to remain there penranently", and thus, each Court held, as a matter of::
that i.rttent didn't matter, since the relative was not living apart in a seoarate
household at the tirre of the accident and thus, each relative was a resident of
the named insured' s household a...-id covered by the nam=d insured' s oolicy of autoIIDbile insurance.

A fortiori, if a relative is a resident of the named insurei':

household when he has lived there for two weeks, one m:mth, and tlvo rronths prior
to the accident, as a matter of law. the:i. certainly

a child, such as \hlliaro

Charles Dennis, who is living with the narred insured father at the t:ilre of the ;c·
cident and who has lived there with his naIIEd insured father for three I1Dntb.s
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accident and covered as an
additional insured under his father's autorrobile

I

-33insurance policy.
Under Utah law, William Charles Dennis was a "resident" for divorce
purposes , the requirerrEnt being "three IIDnths next prior to cornnencerrent of the
actior:"

30-3-1, Utah C.Ode Annotated, 1953, as amended.

He was also a resident

for purposes of the Utah Driver's License Statute, since he had sojourned in Utah
fora period of GO days.

41-21-l(b), Utah Code Anrotated, 1953, as amended.

was also a "resident" for voting purposes.
as amended.

Ee

20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

Thus, if William Charles Demis is a legal resident of the State of

Utah for divorce, driver's license, and voting purposes, and the only place he has

lived in Utah during the three rront11s he has been in Utah prior to the accidei-it is
at his father's household, then, a fortiori, he was a resident of his father's
~ousehold

at the time of the accident.
COIUUSIOll
c:OW that ti1e foregoir.g applicable case law has been fully disclosed by

Hespondents, Holders, (1) as to the nature of the case, whether a living with
inclusion case, a living apart inclusion case, or an exclusior: case, and (2) as
.

'I

to the facts of each case, such as whether the child or relative was living with
the named insured at the tine of the accident, or living apart in a seoarate household at the tirre of the accident, the value and applicability of each case as a
precedent for deciding the case at bar can now be determii.-ied.

In this regard,

Hespondenc, Holders, submit the foll=ing:

1.

Appellant, GEICO, has imJroperly atteTipted to have this Court, as

it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the law of "e.'Cclusion" cases,
'.vhere a strict interpretation is applied to the term "resident of the same household".

As the author of the Annotation poiJ1ted out, "exclusion" cases "are of

little value as precedents in applying clauses extending coverage to

·ihom the tenn applies".

t.~ose

to

93 ALR 3d '.+27.
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as

-34it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the law of "inclusion" cases
where the child or relative was "living apart" from the narred insured in c separate household at the time of the accident, which is contrary to and different
from the facts in the case at bar.

'Mlile in such "living apart" cases, the

"alleged insureds' intention in living separately from the narred insured rray be
an important consideration in determining such persons status as a 'resident'
of b'le named insured' s household" (93 ALR 3d 427) and hence, create an issue cc
be resolved by a jury, the case at bar is not a "living apart" case and thus,
"intention" is not relevant or material and hence, there are no issues for the
jury to resolve.

Under the ur.controverted facts of the case at bar, as the

trial Court initially observed, "it doesn't make a.-iy difference whether the
alleged insured intended to go some place else at sane future time or not".
(Tr. 427).

3.

Since the case at bar is a living with inclusion case, where a

child was living with his ll8IIEd insured father at the tirre of foe accident,
the living with inclusion cases are the only cases that have value as precedents
in determining whether or not the trial Court co=ectly held, as a matter of la1·'
that William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's household at the til:e
of the accident and hence, an acditional irnured under his father's policy of
liability insurance.

Under all of the cases cited "where such child was staying

with t::he named insured during a period t.'lat includeC: t.'le date of the accident,
. . . Courts have held, under a variety of cirCU!Il3 tances, that the child qualifi"as a 'resident' or 'merroer' of the narred insured's 'household'.

Such results

J
1

I

have been reached despite circ:urrstances that included the child's separate livir; I
a=angeirents during a prior period, and the child's status as an individual ouer
the age of rrajority."
to the contrary.

93 ALR 3d 425.

'There is not 011e case, with sirri.lar face'

93 ALR 3d 438-440.

Because of the irrportance of the recent Annotation, ern:itled:
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"Who

-35ls 'Resident' Or 'Member' Of Same 'Eousehold' Or 'Family' As Narred Insured, Within
Liability Insurance Provision Defining Additional Insureds", a copy of the pertinent pages, including those cited by Appellant ar,d Respondents, has been attached
as an Exhibit.
Based on the uncontroverted dispositive facts di.at this is a living wid1
inclusion case, where the child, William Qiarles D=nnis, was living with his named
insured father at d1e tine of the accident and had been living with his father for
a period of about three rronths prior to t.'l.e accident and was not living apart from
his named insured father in a separate householcl at the tirre of the accident, Respondents, Holders, respectfully submit that under such uncontroverted facts, there
were no factual issues for the jury to resolve.

William Charles Dennis' intentions

were not l!'aterial or relevant and there was only one reasonable inference to be
dravm fr= st:eh uncontrcverted facts and that was that William Charles Dennis was
a resident of his father's household at the tirre of the accident at<d hence, an
additional insured ui.der his father's policy of liabilitv insurance.
illus, it is not difficult to see how the trial O:Jurt wasinitiallymisledby
Appellant, GEICD, in insisting that there was case law in support of its position
that Willian: Q1arles I::ennis' "intention" created an issue of fact, which should be
submitted to the jury and why the trial C.ourt improperly added to what otherwise
would have been a co=ect instruction, the language which stated that William
Charles Dennis' "intended duration must be determined" (Instruction No. 14).
fICNJever, once the trial Court had an ooporturii ty to study, reflect, and become
fully advised as to the law, Appellant, GEICO's atterrpted deception was discovered.

'.lilliarn Charles Dermis' intentions did not create an issue of fact, which should
have been subrritted to the jury, because the case at bar was a living with inclu~

case, where intention is not relevant or !l'aterial, and not a living aoart

inclusion case or an exclusion case, where intent ll'ay create an issue of fact,
which should be submitted to the jury.

gb

In accordance therewith and ncM being
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ii,

w

-36the uncontroverted dispositive facts, f7ranted Jud\'I'.'ent to Respondents, LT0Dvitl1standing The Verdict.

This was in accord with the law, as recently statc;d bv

the Utah Suprerr.e Court Ll-iat '\vhen tJ.1e ends of justice require it, a trial Judge
has the power and the duty to set asicie a jury's verdict and
Judgrr.ent '.btwid1standing The Verdict.

4

grant a

Since "t.1-ie Appellate Court has a corres-

ponciing responsibilicy" 5 , Respondents, Holders, respectfully submit Ll-iat "the
ends of justice require" Ll-iat U.'ce Utah Suprerr.e Court affinn the decision of t:.'te
trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
MO!\GAll, SCALLEY & DAVIS

~Md~o-J

Attorney for Defendants- In- liiterventior.
and Respondents, Holders

CTK.LIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify Ll-iat I 1119.iled two true and correct copies of t!:'.e for2going i3rief Of Respondent to David H. Epperson, Attorney for Plaintiff-Apoellant

175 South West 'Ierrple, I·lo. 650, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and to Joseph C
Fratto, Sr., Attorney for Defendant-P-espondent, llilliam lliarles Lennis, L..31 Sou:·

300 East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, posta;ee prepaid, tbis
of February, 1981.

4

nlpack v. Wignall, supra, at 46G.

5
Ibid, supra, at 466.
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ANNOTATION
WHO IS "RESIDENT" OR "MEMBER" OF SAME
"HOUSEHOLD" OR "FAMILY" AS NAMED INSURED, WITHIN
LIABILITY INSURANCE PROVISION DEFINING ADDITIONAL
INSUREDS
by

David B. Harrison, j.D.

I.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

I. Introduction:
[a] Scope
[b]-Related matters
§ 2. Summary and comment:
[a] Generally
[b] Practice pointers
§

II. SPOUSE Of NAMED INSURED

§ 3. Where living with named insured

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES
Am jur 2d. Auwmobiie Insurance §§ 80. 98, 107; 43 Am Jur 2d,
Insurance§§ 251-253. 315: 44 Amjur 2d. Insurance§ 1408
3 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev). Automobile Insurance. Forms 71. 76,
151, 151.05. 151.l, 156, 157, 157.1, 157.2: 14 Amjur Pl & Pr Forms
(Rev), Insurance, Form 352
3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d. Auwmobile Insurance §§ 32:6&-32:68
13 Am Jur Proof of Facl5 2d 681, Resident of Household of Named
Insured
US L Ed Digest, Insurance §§ 304-306
ALR Digests, Insurance§§ 836, 837, 845, 849, 879, 881
L Ed Index

to

Annos, Dom1Cil or Residence; Insurance

A.LR Qu1Ck Index, Add1uonal Insured; Automobile Insurance; Domicil
or Residence; Family or Household: Insurance
Federal Quick Index. Auwmobile Insurance: Domicil or Re.idence;
Insurance
Consult POCKET PART in this volume for later cues
420
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LIABILITI POLICY-ADDITIONAL INSUREDS

93 ALR3d

93 ALR3d 420

§ 4. Where living apart from named insured:

[a] Held "resident" or "member"
[b] Held not "resident" or "member"
III. CHILD OF NAMED INSURED
A. STATUS WHERE NAMED INSURED Is ALIVE WHEN ALLEGED ADDITIONAL lNSURED's CLAIM OF CovERAGE ARISES

1-_L_Cbi ld..liYing_Jrith..DJ!JJled i.ns ureQ
§ 6. Child living with named insured's former spouse or spouse having
separate residence:
[a] Held "resident" or "member"
[b) Held not "resident" or "member"
7. Child living apart from named insured while serving m Armed Forces
8. Child living apart from named insured while attending educational
institution
9. Child living apart from named insured under other Circumstances:
[a] Held "resident" or "member"
[b] Held not "resident" or "member"
B.

STATUS WHERE NAMED INSURED Is DECEASED WHEN ALLEGED
ADDITIONAL INSURED's CLAIM OF CovERAGE ARISES

§ 10. Held not "member" of "household"
IV. OniER RELATIVES OF NAMED INSURED

§ 11. Held "resident" or "member"

§ 12. Held not "resident" or "member"
V. PERSONS NoT RELATED TO 1'AMED INSURED

§ 13. Held· not "resident" or "member"

INDEX
Accidental death, liability for. § 7, 11, 12
Agent's sratement as to insurance coverage of child away from home, effect of,
§8
Age of majority, status of child reachmg,
§5
Alive insured, status of child of when
claim of coverage arises. § § 5-9
Apartment, coverage as affected by moving, §§ 9[a], 13
Armed Forces. effect of service with.
§ 4[a]. 7, 11
Automobile liability policy, § § 4 et seq.
AWOL, nonresident son returning to
navy base after being, § 7
Boarder's automobile insurance- policy,

coverage for unrelated members of
household, § 13
Brother, coverage of. § 12
Child of named insured, § § 5-10
College. status of child living away from
home while attending, § 8
Comment and summary, § 2
Comprehensive personal liability policv.
coverage under, §§ 4[aJ. 6[a]
Contributing to expenses of home. effect
on status, § 11
Custody of son as affecung coverage,
§§ 6[d]. 7, 9[a]
Daughter-in-law living with husband's
family. status of. § 11
421

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§ l[a)

LIABILITY POLICY-ADDITIONAL INSUREDS

93 ALR3d

93 ALR3d 420

Since relevant statutory provisions
are discussed herein only to the extent that they are reflected in the
reported cases falling within the
scope of this annotation, and since
the scope and wording of liability
policies have frequently been the subject of legislation, the reader is advised to consult the latest enactments
in the JUnsdiction of interest.
[b] Related matters
Who is "named insured" or "designated as named insured" within
meaning of automobile insurance coverage. 91 ALR3d 1280.
Validity. construction, and application of provision of automobile liabilitv policy excluding from coverage
injury or death of member of family
or household of insured. 46 ALR3ci
1024.
Automobile insurance: coverage as
extending beyond death of named
insured. 30 ALR3d 104i.
Liability insurance: insurable interest. 1 ALR3d 1193.
Exclusion from "drive other cars"
provision of automobile liability insurance policy of other automobile
owned, hired. or regularly used by
insured or member of his household.
86 ALR2d 937.
What is a "non-owned" automobile
within the meaning of the coverage
clause of an automobile liability policy. 83 ALR2d 926.
Who is member of insured's "family" or "household" within coverage
of property insurance policy. 1
the named insured or an additional insured while such person ts operaung a
vehicle which is not descnbed m the policy but which 1s owned or furnished for
the regular use of a "resident" or "member" of the named insured's "household."

7. Several courts,
424

tn

cases appearing

ALR2d 561.

•

Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance
Law, 2d Ed.
Woodroof, Fonseca, and Squillante,
Automobile Insurance and No-Fault
Law.
§ 2. Summary and comment

(a] Generally
A review of the cases construing or
applying the particular policy terms
that are the subject of the present
annotation reveals a wide variety of
factual considerations upon which the
courts have focused in their determinations of whether a particular person
was a "resident" or "member" of the
same "household" or "family" as the
jnamed insured at a particular time.
trhose factual considerations not only
elate to the respective individual's
physical presence in, or absence from,
the named insured's home during the
period that included the date of a
particular occurrence, but also relate
to such matters as the relationship (if
any) of the individual to the named
insured, the ciri:umstances of such
person's presence in or absence from
the named insured's home, the individual's living arrangements during
earlier time periods, and the individual's intention at various times with
cegard to his place ol residence. Such
factual considerations have become
particularly significant ·in view of the
express recognition by courts, in numerous cases appearing throughout
the annotation, that some or all of the
respective policy terms are ambiguous
or devoid of any fixed meaning.'
throu11hout the annotation, have adopted
a dicuonarv definition applying the term
"household'' to a group of persons
"dwelling" under the same roof as a
"family." In most of those cases, however.
the courts ha\'.e weighed a number of
factors in determining whether a particu-

lar individual was part of the named in-
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93 ALR3d

LIABILITY POLICY-ADDITIONAL INSlJREDS

§ 2[a]

ALR3d 420
r--- - - - - - - - - - · ----93----..,

, A significant portion of the cases··
, focusing upon one or more of the;
policy cenns under consideration have
\ involved a child of the named insured. Where such child was staying;
w~th the n~in-~c!_jml!l:ed !luri_n_g: a pe1
riod that inclu_<k_d __c_he__d_ate _of tbe 1
aCCldentOr other:_ OCC\!CT~IK_e _givi_ng
lrise to the controvei:rr co_11_c_~rn_i_ng_ the :
hild's status, courts _l]ave __h~l9~ o_n I,
l:.ii:e basis of a variety_ __of circtim- i
~tances, that file child qualified _as_ a j
'resident" or "member" of the '
j
fiamed insured's "ho~seh_ol{,L~esults have been reached <k.s~~i!:umstances that included the child's
~living arrangements--dilriii_g_ai
f>rior periq_d,_ and th~_chiig'i_ ~t'!_S -~
an individual_~_ the a~ 9f majo_r:-J
li1*'
'
Where the child was living apar_t
from the named insured while attending school, such child's absence has
not prevented courts from determining, under the circumstances of several cases, that the child remained
during his absence a "resident" of
the named insured's "household.' ..
The courts in such cases have emphasized a variety of factors, including
the circumstances that ( 1) the child
continued to use the named insured's
mailing address for various purposes,
(2) the child left his possessions at
the named insured's home, and (3)
the child considered his dwelling
place at school to be merely temporary.
Similarly, a child's absence while
serving in the military has been held
under the circumstances of numerous
1

5.;cJ.,

1

1

sured's "family," or whether such mdiHdual could be conSidered to have been
"dwelling" with that "fam1lv."

cases not co interfere with his "reS1dence" in the named insured's "household," the courts in such cases focusing upon factors such as the
child's presence under the named insured's roof pnor co his entry into
the service. and his lack of choice
concerning the location of his military
station. 10

Varvir-g results have been reached
by courts considering the situation
where the named insured and his
spouse were divorced or separated.
and a child of the named insured was
staying with the spouse (or former
spouse) for a period including. the
date of the occurrence giving rise to
the litigation concerning such child's
status. Undu the circumstances of
some of the cases. the child was held
co be a "resident" 0£ the -named insured's "household'' despite his absence from the named insured's
home, 11 while under the orcumstances of other cases. the child was
held not to be a "resident" or "member" of the named insured's "house- hold" at the relevant time. 12
The status of a child living apart
from the named insured under circumstances ocher than those related
to such child's military service or education, or the divorce (or separation)
of his parents. has been the subject of
several other cases within the scope
of the present annotation. Based
upon the circumstances of some of
those cases. the respective child was
held to be a "resident" of the insured
parent's "household,"" while under
the circumstances of ocher cases. the
10. § 7. infra.
11. § 6[a]. infra.

~infra.

12. § 6[b]. infra.

9. § 8, infra.

13. § 9(a]. infra.

425
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§ 2[a)

LIABILITY Poucv-AooITIONAL INSUREDS

93 ALR3d

93 ALR3d 420

child was held to have failed to qualify as such a "resident. " 14
Litigation concerning the status of
the named insured's spouse as a "resident" or "member" of the same household as the named insured has focused primarilv upon the situation in
which the sppuse was living apart
from the named insured due to domestic difficulties or other reasons.
Referring to circumstances such as
the spouse's long period of absence
prior to the date of the particular
occurrence giving nse to the suit, and
the spouse's intention never to return
to the named insured's home, some
courts have held that the spouse's
"residence" or "membership" in the
named msured's household was terminated prior to the particular occurrence." However, courts under other
circumstances have determined that
the spouse remained a "resident" of
the named insured's "household" despite such spouse's absence from the
named insured's dwelling place during the period that included the date
of the respecuve occurrence." Factors
such as the temporary nature of the
particular separation have been
deemed significant in cases of the
latter vanetv.
Where the named insured and his
spouse were living under the same
roof during a period which included
the date of the occurrence giving rise
to the controversv concerning the
spouse's status, it was held, on the
basis of the particular circumstances.
that the spouse was at the time of
such occurrence a "member" of the
named insured's "household.""
Relauves other than the named msured's spouse or child have also
14. § 9[b], infr.i.
15. § 4[b], mfra.

16. § 4[a], mfra.
17. § 3, mfra
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been the subject of cases within the
scope of the present annotation. The
courts under the circumstances of
some of those cases have determined
that the respective relative was a "resident" or "member" of the named
insured's "household."" But under
the circumstances of other cases the
courts have denied the particular individual's status as a "member" or
"resident" of the named insured's
"household" or "immediate family. " 11
Under the circumstances of the
small number of cases involving
claims that a person who was not
related by blood or marriage to the
named insured was at a particular
ume a "resident" of the named insured's "household," the courts have
held that the status of "resident" of
the "household" could not extend to
the particular nonrelative.•
In a number of instances, the
courts. have considered the circumstance that at the time a particular
individual was allegedly living as a
"member" of the named insured's
"household," the named insured was
deceased. Such cases have generally
involved persons claiming to have
been operating an insured automobile
with the permission of the named
insured's child, who was alleged to be
an "adult member" of the named
insured's "household," within the
meaning of a policy provision extending liability coverage to persons operating an insured vehicle with the permISsion of such an "adult member."
Under the circumstances of each of
the cases where the issue has arisen,
however, the courts have denied the
child's status as an "adult member"
of the "household," and have ex18. § 11. infra.
19. § 12. infra.
20. § 13, infra.
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pressed the view that the death of the
named insured terminated the existence of his "household.""
[b) Practic_e_R_C!i!'.~e~ _

·--counsel seeking to prove that a
\particular individual was a "resident"
·of the same "household" as the
loamed insured may find it helpful to ,
/make the point, recognized by numer- '
'ous courts, 12 that such terms are am' biguous and should therefore be conlstrued, in accordance with general
!principles of insurance law, in such a '
llmanner as to favor policy coverage."'
The point has also been made that ,
,since the terms are to be construed :
so as to favor coverage, the cases'
which have focused upon those terms I
; in the context of policy clauses ~,
Iduding liability coverage of an indii vidual found to be a "resident" of the ,
named insured's "household" are of:
\little value as precedents in apPIYioi:
\clauses extending coverage to tho~e '\
lw wham the terms apply."' Counsel
for an alleged insured may therefore I
find it helpful, where such cases are
cited as authority by opposing counsel, to emphasize the tendency of I
courts, in attempting to construe the
relevant terms in such a manner as to
\favor cove:gep to a:fPl~ those terms '
[i!arrowly
a pose t the maniiir
J.iri_ which the same terms would he
\ pp!" ed if occurring in inclusionary i

l

1

I
'1

pohq da11Ks.______________ ____
21. § 10, infra.

22. See, for examr,le, Crossett v St.
Louis Fire &: Marine ns. Co. (1972) 289
Ala 598, 269 So 2d 869, infra § 8; Aetna
Casualty &: Surety Co. v Miller (1967, DC
Kan) 276 F Supp 341 (applying Kansas
law); Mazzilli v Acci. & Casualty Ins. Co.
(1961) 35 NJ I, 170 A2d 800, both infra
§ 4[a].

23. But see Pamperin v Milwaukee Mut.
Ins. Co. (1972) 55 Wis 2d 27, 197 NW2d
783, infra § 12. which is one of the few
cases in which the court expressed the

.1

§ 2[b]

Counsel for an alleged insured may
also find it helpful to draw the attention of the trier of fact to any policy
language from which an inference
might be drawn as to the intention of
the insurer and the named insured
with respect IO the application of the
poLicy clauses referring to such
phrases as "resident of the named
insured's household." In this connection, at least one court has seized
upon the term "'family," appearing in
the policy title ("Family Automobile
Policy"). and has inferred from that
word an intention to protect all members of a particular family as long as a
family relationship legally existed
(and even though the person claiming
coverage was separated from her insured husband and had filed for d1vorce).'"
1 In cases involving an alleged inured who was living apart from the
amed insured at the relevant time,
uch alleged insured's intention in
ivin se aratel from the named inured ma be an im ortant consideration in determining such person's staamed
tus as a "resident" of th
·nsured's "household."
here the alleged insured had at the time of separation formed an intention never to
return, counsel for the party seeking
to exclude such individual from covview that the tenns "resident" and "household" are unambiguous, and that in

applying those terms it makes no difference whether the policy used the terms to
include persons as insureds or to exclude
persons from coverage.

24. See, for example, Crossett v St.
Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. ( 1972) 289
Ala 598, 269 So 2d 869. infra § S.
25. Aetna Casualty & Suretv Co. v
Miller ( 1967, DC Kan) 276 F Supp 341.
infra § 4(a].
427
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erage may find it beneficial to bring
that circumstance to 1he attention of
the tner of fact.,. The alleged insured' s intention that his or her absence from the named insured's
dwelling place was to be merely temporary, or such person's lack of an
intention to permanently live apart
from the named insured, is a factor
which counsel for the alleged insured
would ordinanly be well advised to
bring out. 77
Although the cases considering an
individual's status as a "resident" of a
particular "household" generally focus upon the individual's status at the
time of the occurrence from which
the conflicting claims of coverage
arose, the courts have in some instances considered circumstances existing after the respective incidents as
having a bearing upon the question
of the particular individual's status at
the time of the incident. Where the
named insured and his or her spouse
were, because of marital problems,
living separately prior to the spouse's
involvement in an accident with respect to which liabilitv coverage is
claimed, counsel for such alleged insured might find it helpful, where
warranted by the evidence,• to attempt to bring out the parties· subsequent reconciliation as bearing upon
the spouse's. intention at the time of
the particular incident.
26. See. for example. Firemen's Ins.
Co. v Burch ( 1968, Tex Civ App) 426
SW2d 306, affd in pan and vacated in
pan on other grounds (Tex) 442 SW2d
331. infra § 4(b]. in which the court's
decision. denying liabilily coverage to the
named msured's wife was based in pan
upon the observation that from the time
she had become separated from her husband, she never intended to resume living
With ham.
27. As an example of a case in which
such factors were deemed to be signifi-

II. Spouse of named insured
§ 3. Where living with named insured
Under the following circumstances
it was held that the named insured's
spouse, who was living under the
same roof as the named insured on
the dav of an occurrence giving rise
to the spouse's claim of coverage
under the named insured's liability
policy, was at the time of the occurrence a "member" of the named insured's "household."
Construing a garage liability policy
clause providing coverage with respect to certain of the named insurec:\'s automobiles when used for
nonbusiness purposes by a "member
of the household" of the named insured, the court in Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v Johnson (1961, ND)
1 IO NW2d 224, held that the named
insured's wife, who was living with
her husband at the time of her involvement in an accident while driving an automobile owned by him,
qualified at the time of the accident
as a "member" of her husband's
"household." That there could be no
doubt as to the wife's status was, in
the court's view, a conclusion that
was warranted by (I) judicial authority supporting the proposition that
the terrn "household" applied to persons dwelling together as a family,
and (2) a dictionary definition applying the terrn to a family, a domestic
cant, see Hawaiian Ins. &: Guaranty Co. v
Federated American Ins. Co. (1975) 13
Wash App 7, 534 P2d 48, 93 ALR3d
407, infra § 4(a].
%8. As an example of a decision in
which a subsequent reconciliation was
taken into consideration in determining
whether a separation was intended to be
temporary or pennanen(, see Hawaiian
Ins. & Guaranty Co. v Federated American Ins. Co. 11975) 13 Wash App 7, 534
P2d 48. 93 ALR3d 407, infra § 4(a].
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III. Child of named insured
A. Status where named insured is
alive when alleged additional
insured's claim of coverage arises

~

5.

Child living_~ilh nam~ insured
Thescatus of the named insured's
hild as a "resident" or "member" of
he named insured's "household" has
een an issue both m cases constru0ing policy provisions extending liability coverage to a "resident" of the
named insured's "household," and
cases dealing with policy language
extending liability coverage to one
operating an insured automobile with
, the permission of an "adult member"
Iof the named insured's "household."
'Des~ evidence_gf such matters . as
the separace--living arrange-ments that
the partic\ilar ~hild haCI on previous I
occasions, or the child'~ auainmerH_ 9f
theage o'f 111ajori!}', th_e _c 0 ur\~ und~
the circumstance5_()f _\he__ follgwi_ng
cases held either that (11-Lcl:iil<lJiying under theSarn~~_goJ -~_his__in
sµred parent on th,e .ili!1e~ of _the
accident or other occurrence giving
rise to the suit was at thetime-oEum
o~ a "resfdent'~r-''memoe'r"
of the named insured's''llousehold:"
O~there_ w<!S.::-~uffiZi_ent evidence to 2!1.P.J'.>Orl the_ co11@sion tfiat
a child living under th!' named_ i_nsured's roof on the relevant date
s11_ch a "res.iikni,'• - _:____
-~
Focusmg upon that portion of an
automobile liability policy's nonowned automobile clause extending
coverage to a "resident" of the same
"household" as the named insured,
the court in Travelers Ins. Co. v
Mixon (1968) 118 Ga App 31, 162
1

'1

= ______)

SE2d 830. held that a finding that the
son of the named insured was not a
"resident" of his father's "household" at the time of the son· s involvement in a mo10r vehicle collision was
not required as a matter of law where
there was evidence ind1caung. mter
alia, that although the son had, during the 6-month period prior to the
accident. lived and worked 111 a separate cit; from that of his father. he
had returned to h1S father's house on
most weekends during that period
and was returning from what had
apparently been a weekend at his
father's house when the accident occurred. The court referred to vanous
other matters, including, mter aha,
evidence that (I) for 3 or '1 months
following his gTaduation from high
school the son had continued to live
in his father's home, until he found
work in the other citv, (2) when he
returned to his fath~r· s house on
weekends. his mother did h1S laundry
and prepared food for him to. take
back, and (3) he had a room in his
father's house where he left some of
his clothes. The court added that the
judicial authorities did not md1cate
that residing at another place for a
part of the time prevented a relative
from being a resident of the household under an extension of coverage
provision. Moreover, the court noted
that the insurer could have employed
terminology such as "reSJdent exclusively" or "resident for a greater part
of the time" if it had w1Shed to so
limit the coverage.
· Applying automobile liability policv
language providing coverage for
those driving the insured automobile
with the permission of the named

r nro;.-p-.;-r-po,es oflhe present sectio-n:~ - S:Ured'S
~ven

if the child

wa5

on his way

to

an-

pther dwelling at the time of the particular occurrence, such child is deemed to

p~~_living under the named in-

93 ALR3d

roof ,-,-on the date of" the octur-

rence 1f the child was sta~ing wllh th~
named insured for a period that included

both the day prior to the occurrence rnd
a f'"-" of the day of the occurrence.
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insured or an "adult member" of his
"household,.. the court in Ocean
Acc1. & Guaranty Co. v Schmidt
( 1931, CA6 Ky) 46 F2d 269, held, in
a decision apparently applying Kentucky law, that the named insured's
24-year-old son, who at all relevant
times lived, ate his meals. slept. and
had his washing cone in the home of
his father, was an "adult member" of
his father's "household," even though
he was not dependent upon his father
for support. The court noted that the
term "household" had such dictionarv definitions as ( 1) a domestic
est~blishment, (2) the members of a
house collectively, and (3) those who
dwf!l under the same roof and compose a family. The court concluded
that in view of those definitions, it
had no doubt as to the status of a son
who has reached majority and supports himself. but who lives under his
parents' roof.
Construing liability policy language
defining the term "insured" to includ~ relatives of the named insured
if "residents of his household," the
court in Miller v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1974) 127 NJ
Super 37, 316 A2d 51. held that a
divorced couple's 9-year old son, who
set fire to the plaintiffs' barn after
having been brought to his father's
home for a weekend visit. was at the
time of the incident not onlv a "resident" of the "household" ~f his father, with whom he stayed on weekends, but was also a "resident" of the
"household" of his mother. with
whom he lived during the week. In an
opinion pertaining to coverage under
policies issued bv both the father's
and the mother's insurers, the court
>lated that the term "household" is
not confined within universally accepted limits, and that members of a
family need not in all cases reside
under a common roof in order to be

§5

deemed part of a "household." The
court also stated that "residence"
does not involve the elements of permanancy, continuity, and kinship with
physical, social, cultural, and political
attributes that are inherent in a
"home" (in the sense of a domicile),
and that while a person could have
only one true domicile, he could have
more than one residence. The court
rejected the argument, that the controlling factor in determining the
household of which the boy was a
resident was a decree awarding custody to the mother and mere visitation rights to the father: The court
stated that one of the purposes of the
extended coverage provision of the
policies was to assist the named insured in complying with his moral
and legal obligauon to maintain and
support his family, and that the prac-·
tice under which the boy stayed with
his mother during the week and his
father on each weekend indicated that
a substantially integrated family relationship existed between the boy and
his mother on the one hand and the
boy and his father on the other. In
the court's opinion, the boy's intention to be a part of each household
was clearly manifested by the fact that
when he was asked who he lived with,
he replied "My dad and my mom."
Construing automobile liability policy language which extended coverage
(with respect to the operation of nonowned automobiles) to any relative of
the named insured qualifying as a
"resident of the same household" as
the named insured, the court in
Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1966) 266 NC
430, 146 SE2d 410, held that the
named insured's 29-year-old son. who
had been living with his father ]Qr
about 2 weeks at the time of his
irr;olvement in. a motor vehicle col!ision, was a "resident of the same
439
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household" as his father despite the
fact that the son had previously lived
in other places and had returned to
his father's home with the intention
of ultimately finding a room in a
boarding house. The court pointed
out, inter alia, that the word "resident" has many shades of meaning,
ranging from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode,
and that when an insurer uses a "slippery" word to designate those who
are insured by the policy, it is not the
court's function "to sprinkle sand
upon the ice" by construing the term
strictly. That the son was "a resident
of the same household" as his father
was, in the court's view, clearly shown
by the circumstances 1ha1 ( 1) the son,
who had become separated from his
wife, had no home of his own, (2)
when he came back to his father's
house, he carried with him all his
possessions, (3) the son had intended
to remain at his father's house until
quarters more convenient to his employment could be found, (4) he ate
at his father's house, slept there, had
his laundry done with the family laundry, and had the run of the house,
and (5) he paid no board.
Despite 1he circumstance that the
named insured's son had quit high
school and left his father's community
prior to the son's involvement in an
automobile accident, the court in
Travelers lndem. Co. v Mattox (1961,
Tex Civ App) 345 SW2d 290, writ ref
n re, held that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding
that the son, who was staying with his
parents at the lime of the accident,
was at that time a "resident of the
same household" as the named insured (his father), within the meaning
of an automobile liability policy
clause extending coverage to 1hose of
the named insured's relatives who
qualified as such "residents.". The
440

court pointed out that the domicile of
a minor child is as a mailer of law
that of his father, and thal since "residence" is a lesser included element
within the technical definition of the
broader term "domicile," it followed
that if the young man had his domicile in the house of his father, he had
a residence there also, even though
he may have had other residences at
the same time. The court further
stated that if he had a residence at his
father's house, then he was a "resident of the same household," within
the meaning of the policy. Moreover.
the court pointed out that whether or
not the son's residence was in "the
same household" as his father was a
factual matter, and the court referred,
as supporting its conclusion, to the
circumstances that (I) when the son
left his father's community to go to
work for a brother in another town,
he carried only his work clothes, leaving all of his .other personal belongings at his father's house, and (2)
before the son quit school and left,
his father had talked to him about
finishing school, and it was his father's opinion that the boy would
return to school the following year if
a change of teachers were made.
But see Indemnity Ins. Co. v Sanders, ( 1934) 169 Okla 378, 36 P2d
271, infra § 12, in which the court,
although focusing upon the question
whether the named insured's son-inlaw was a member of his facher-inlaw's household, stated in dictum that
the named insured's daughter, who
was spending a few days with her
parents because of marital problems,
was not a "member" of the "household" of her father.
To the same effect (and arising
from the same accident) as Indemnity
Ins. Co. v Sanders (1934) 169 Okla
378, 36 P2d 271. supra. is Indemnitv
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IN TI-IE SUPREME OOURT OF TI-IE STAIB OF UTAH

GJVERNMENI' EMPI.DYEES INSURANCE
(XWANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

)
)
)
)

FI l ED
'JCT 14 hCI

)
)

vs.
WILLIAM CHARLF.5 DENNIS ,

Clo•l Suooeme Court. Utah

)
)

)

Defendant and Respondent,

vs.

JAMES C. OOLDER, BARBARA ANN OOLDER,
' and JAMES C . OOLDER, as Guardian Ad
Litan for JEFFERY OOLDER, WENDI
OOIDER, and JUSTIN OOLDER, minors ,

Defendants-In-Intervention
and Respondents.

)

RFSPONDENTS' ADDITIONAL AUIHORITI

)
)
)
)

PURSUANI' TO RlJ1E 75(p)(3) U.R.C.P.

)

Claim tb.

)
)
)
)
)

17267

Cil1ES tn-1 Defendants-In-Intervention and Respondents, Holders, pursuant
to Rule 75(p) (3) Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, and sulxnit as additional autoority

the following cases, which are listed in Shepherds Citations citing Bucklin v. Nationwide M.!tual Insurance Corrpany as autoority:

State Farm 11..ttual Autooobile Insurance

Coupany

v. Borg, 396 F2d. 740 (8th

Cir. Minn. 1968).
Alabama Farm Bureau 11..ttual Insurance

Coupany

v. Pigott

39~

So,2d 1379 (Ala

1981) .
Peninsula Insurance Crnpany v. Knight 255 A2d. 55(1'ti. 1969).
These cases were referred to in Respondents ' Argunent and parts of the
~ case were read verbatim to the Court.

The cases should be included in the

"Argurent" section of Respondents' Brief.
IM\1ED this 14th day of October, 1981.
MJRGAN, SCALLEY

& IM\VIS
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to Joseph C. Fratto Sr. , Attorney for Defendant
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